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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wally Schultz was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) in one case and felony domestic violence (battery) in another. 
Although the two cases were largely unrelated, they were, at times, handled together in 
the district court and then consolidated in the present appeal. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Schultz pled guilty in the possession case. 
On appeal, he raises no issues related to that case. 
The battery case, however, proceeded to a jury trial wherein the prosecutor 
made certain arguments which Mr. Schultz now contends were improper. Specifically, 
Mr. Schultz asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by implicitly commenting 
on Mr. Schultz' failure to testify, and by exhorting the jury to convict Mr. Schultz based 
on sympathy for the alleged domestic violence victim, a desire to protect her from 
further abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence problems generally. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On April 7, 2005, Wally Schultz was arrested based on suspicion of 
methamphetamine possession. (Drug Case R., p.23.)' The following day, he was 
charged with a single count of possession of a controlled substance 
This is a consolidated appeal of two Minidoka County cases. To limit confusion, one 
case (Supreme Court No. 33255) is referred to herein as the "Drug Case" and the other 
(Supreme Court No. 33256) is referred to as the "Battery Case." Accordingly, citations 
to the Clerk's Records in this Appellant's brief include the prefix "Drug Case," or Battery 
Case," as appropriate. 
(methamphetamine) in Minidoka County Case No. CR-2005-884 (hereinafter, Drug 
Case). (Drug Case R., pp.19-20.) 
On April 26, 2005, Mr. Schultz waived his preliminary hearing in the Drug Case 
(Drug Case R., p.45) and was bound over to district court (Drug Case R., p.49). That 
same day, Mr. Schultz was released from jail on his own recognizance. (Drug Case 
R., pp.52-53.) 
The following day (April 27, 2005), the State filed its information. (Drug Case 
R., pp.55-56.) It also filed an Information Part II alleging that Mr. Schultz is a "persistent 
violator" within the meaning of I.C. 3 19-2514. (Drug Case R., pp.57-58.) 
On May 2, 2005, Mr. Schultz appeared in district court in the morning for his 
arraignment in the Drug Case. (Drug Case R., pp.60-61.) Upon returning home, he 
had some sort of an altercation with his former girlfriend, Laurie Morrill. The precise 
details of that altercation are not clear;* however, the fact of the altercation is not 
disputed. Ultimately, Mr. Schultz was arrested and charged with one count of felony 
domestic violence (battery) in Minidoka County Case No. CR-2005-1135 (hereinafter, 
Battery Case). (Battery Case R., pp.5-6.) 
The Battery Case proceeded much more rapidly than the Drug Case, and a jury 
trial was held in the Battery Case on August 24-25, 2005. (See generally Battery Case 
R., pp.103-23; Battery Case Tr.) At trial, one of Mr. Schultz' theories was that 
Ms. Morrill was not living (i.e., "cohabiting") with him on May 2, 2005 and, thus, was not 
* Compare PSI, p.2 (Mr. Schultz's version of events, in which he explained that he was 
under the influence of methamphetamine and cannot remember the details of the 
altercation) wifh Battery Case Trial Tr., p.93, L.25 - p.99, L.14 (Ms. Morrill's version of 
events, in which she claimed that she was brutally attacked). 
a "household member" within the meaning of the domestic violence statute, 
I.C. § 18-918(1)(a).~ (See, e.g., Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.71, L.25 - p.72, L.15 
(defense counsel, arguing in closing, that Ms. Morrill was not living with Mr. Schultz).) 
The evidence on this issue was conflicting, as Ms. Morrill claimed that she was living 
with Mr. Schultz on May 2, 2005, but numerous other witnesses testified that Deanna 
Brady, not Ms. Morrill, was living with him at that time. (Compare Battery Case 
Tr., p.87, Ls.9-1 I (Ms. Morrill claiming to have been living with Mr. Schultz for a four-day 
period in late-April and early-May 2005), and Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.108, Ls.9- 
10 (same), wifh Battery Case Tr., p.75, L . l l  - p.78, L.25 (Miles Witt testifying that it was 
his distinct impression that Deanna Brady was living with Mr. Schultz during the relevant 
timeframe, not Ms. Morrill), and Battery Case Tr., p.128, L.6 - p.131, L.25 (Mr. Schultz' 
seventeen-year-old nephew testifying that he lived at Mr. Schultz' home after 
Mr. Schultz was arrested in the Drug Case, and that he moved out and Ms. Brady 
moved in when Mr. Schultz was released on his own recognizance on April 26, 2005), 
and Battery Case Tr., p.134, L.5 - p.143, L.7 (Mr. Schultz' father testifying that when he 
stopped by his son's home "[a] time or two" in the AprilIMay timeframe, Deanna Brady 
appeared to be living there, and that he did not believe that Ms. Morrill had ever lived 
there), and Battery Case Tr., p.145, L.12 - p.156, L.8 (Deanna Brady testifying that she 
moved in with Mr. Schultz on April 26, 2005, and that she (and only she) continued to 
live with him up through the time of his re-arrest on May 2, 2005). Another of 
Mr. Schultz' theories at trial was that he had acted in self-defense. (See, e.g., p.65, 
The jury was instructed as to the lesser offenses of misdemeanor domestic violence 
and misdemeanor simple battery. (Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.42, L.5.) 
3 
L.24 - p.67, L.23 (defense counsel, arguing in closing, that Ms. Morrill's bruises were 
consistent with her having been restrained while she attempted to hit Mr. Schultz).) 
During the State's closing argument on August 25, 2005, the prosecutor made 
two points which are relevant to the present appeal. First, addressing Mr. Schultz' self- 
defense theory, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be self- 
defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this case, and 
particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and that would be the 
testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified about i t  There wasn'f 
any other testimony abouf it because there were only two people present: 
Laurie Morrill and the defendant. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14 (emphasis added).) Later, while wrapping 
up his closing argument, the prosecutor argued more generally as follows: 
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of giving out 
hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to know that the 
system works. Show her the system works. You can profect Laurie 
Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the evidence and 
returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the defendant 
accountable. I ask you to do that. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
Ultimately, the jury acceded to the State's requests and found Mr. Schultz guilty 
of felony domestic violence. (Battery Case R., pp.100, 122.) A sentencing hearing was 
held in the Battery Case on the morning of December 12, 2005. (See generally Battery 
Case R., p.150; Battery Case Augmented Tr. P.80, L.l - p.105, L.24.) At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, 
with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction over Mr. Schultz. (Battery Case, 
R., pp.150, 153; Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.105, Ls.16-24.) The district court filed 
its judgment of conviction on December 15, 2005. (Battery Case R., pp.151-55.) 
On the afternoon of December 12, 2005, Mr. Schultz attended a change of 
plealsentencing hearing in the Drug Case. (See generally Drug Case R., p.128; Drug 
Case Tr.) At that hearing, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Schultz pled guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance and, in exchange, the State dismissed the 
persistent violator enhancement and an unrelated charge in a different case. (Drug 
Case Tr., p.4, Ls.1-8.) As part of the agreement, the State recommended that the 
district court impose a sentence of seven years, with three years fixed (consecutive to 
the sentence in the Battery Case), but that the district court retain jurisdiction; the State 
also promised that, at the conclusion of Mr. Schultz' "rider," it would either recommend 
that Mr. Schultz' sentences be modified to run concurrently, or it would stand silent in 
the face of a defense request for the same.4 (Drug Case, Tr., p.9, L.16 - p.11, L.7.) 
Ultimately, the district court accepted the agreement and Mr. Schultz' guilty plea, and it 
imposed the stipulated sentence: a unified sentence of seven years, with three years 
fixed, consecutive to the sentence in the Battery Case, and a rider. (Drug Case 
R., pp.128, 312-33; Drug Case Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.2, p.13, L.6 - p.14, L.2.) The 
district court filed its judgment of conviction on December 15, 2005. (Drug Case 
R., pp.129-34.) 
On May 22, 2006, following a successful rider, the district court suspended 
Mr. Schultz' sentences in both cases and placed him on probation for five years. (Drug 
Case R., pp.141, 142, 146; Battery Case R., pp.161, 162, 166; Battery Case 
Augmented Tr., p.1 I I ,  Ls.21-24.) It issued temporary orders the same day. (Drug 
Although it is not clear whether the plea agreement required him to do so, defense 
counsel joined in the State's sentencing recommendation. (Drug Case Tr., p.12, Ls.22- 
23.) 
Case R., p.142; Battery Case R., p.162.) On May 25, 2006, the district court entered 
formal orders placing Mr. Schultz on probation. (Drug Case R., pp.144-50; Battery 
Case R., pp.164-70.) 
On July 6, 2006, Mr. Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal bearing the cases numbers 
for both the Drug Case and the Battery Case. (Drug Case R., pp.151-53; Battery Case 
R., pp.171-73.) Because that Notice of Appeal was timely from the formal orders 
placing Mr.Schultz on probation following his rider, it was timely from the 
December 15, 2005 judgments of conviction as well. See I.A.R. 14(a) ("In a criminal 
case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time the district court 
actually retains jurisdiction . . . . When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or 
places the defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall commence to 
run."). On appeal, Mr. Schultz contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
the Battery Case when he implicitly asked the jury to draw a negative inference from 
Mr. Schultz's decision not to testify, and again when he urged the jury to find 
Mr. Schultz guilty in order to show the alleged victim that "the system works," and to 
protect her others like her. He further contends that such misconduct entitles him to a 
new trial. 
ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct necessitating a new trial? 
ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Misconduct Necessitatina A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Schultz contends that his right to si~ence,~ his right to a fair trial: and his right 
to due process of law7 were abridged through two instances of misconduct during the 
prosecutor's closing arguments in this case. Furthermore, he asserts that whether 
those instances of prosecutorial misconduct are considered individually, or in the 
aggregate, they are so egregious as to constitute fundamental, reversible error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Schultz' prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 ldaho 1, 2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006). 
C. The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Misconduct When He lmplicitlv Asked The Jurv To 
Draw A Neaative Inference From Mr. Schultz' Decision Not To Testifv 
Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Article I § 13 of the ldaho Constitution, no person may be 
compelled, in any criminal case, to be made a witness against himself. The essence of 
this mandate, of course, is that, where the government "proposes to convict and punish 
an individual," it must "produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its 
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO C NST., art. I § 13. 
See U.S. CONST. amends. Vl, XIV; IDAHO C NST., art. I § 13. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO C NST., art. I 3 13. 
officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips." Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 357 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961). 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the United States Supreme Court 
held that this Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the government from 
commenting to the jury about the defendant's decision not to testify. Id. at 615. In 
determining whether a prosecutor's argument is impermissible in this regard, the court 
must ask whether the prosecutor "manifestly intended" to comment on the defendant's 
silence, or his argument was of such character that the jury would "naturally and 
necessarily" take that argument as a comment on the defendant's silence. United 
States v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1992); State v. Wright, 97 ldaho 229, 232, 
542 P.2d 63, 66 (1975). 
"ldaho follows the overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that a 
prosecutor's general references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect 
on the defendant's failure to testify, where wifnesses ofher than the defendant could 
have contradicted the evidence." State v. McMurry, 143 ldaho 312, 314, 143 P.2d 400, 
402 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis in original).' However, the ldaho Court of Appeals has 
recently observed that "[c]omment on the absence of evidence contradicting the state's 
' See, e.g., State v. Rawiings, 121 ldaho 930, 934-35, 829 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1992) 
(holding that the prosecutor's general argument that the State's evidence and testimony 
were unrebutted "was a comment on the evidence and not an impermissible reference 
to the defendant's failure to testify"); State v. Hodges, I05 ldaho 588, 590-92, 671 P.2d 
1051, 1053-55 (1983) (holding that a prosecutor's argument that the government's 
expert's opinion was "uncontradicted" was not "an impermissible reference to the 
defendant's failure to testify" since "[tlhere was no implication that defendant himself 
had some obligation to take the witness stand (and was admitting guilt by not doing 
soy?. 
case is particularly problematic where the defendant is the sole witness who would be 
able to contradict the evidence in question," and it noted that "courts generally hold that 
such comment in this context is improper." McMuriy, 143 ldaho at 315, 143 P.2d at 403 
(emphasis in original). Ultimately, the McMurry Court held that, where the prosecutor 
repeatedly argued that the defense had offered no evidence of self-defense and, 
specifically, no evidence to counter the State's evidence on the self-defense issue, 
those arguments were improper because they went beyond a legitimate rebuttal of the 
defendant's evidence and "suggested the jury should infer guilt from [the defendant's] 
decision to present evidence without venturing upon the witness stand." Id. at 315-16, 
This case is quite similar to McMuriy since, as noted above, the prosecutor 
sought to have the jury reject Mr. Schultz' self-defense theory by arguing that the 
State's evidence on the self-defense issue was never rebutted by the defense: 
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be self- 
defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this case, and 
particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and that would be the 
testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified about it. There wasn't 
any other testimony about it because there were only two people present: 
Laurie Morrill and the defendant. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14 (emphasis added).) Since Mr. Schultz's 
testimony was the only evidence that could have possibly rebutted Ms. Morrill's 
testimony on the self-defense issue, this argument was quite clearly a suggestion that 
Mr. Schultz should be found guilty because he did not take the witness stand to refute 
Ms. Morrill's testimony. Accordingly, it was improper under the United States and ldaho 
Constitutions. 
D. The Prosecutor Engaqed In Misconduct When He Urqed The Jury To Find 
Mr. Schultz Guiltv In Order To Show The Alleaed Victim That "The Svstem 
Works." And To Protect Her And Others Like Her 
Even where prosecutorial arguments do not directly infringe upon rights 
specifically guaranteed by the Constitution (such as the Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination), those arguments may nevertheless violate the United 
States Constitution by rendering the defendant's trial unfair. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Moreover, the ldaho courts have long-recognized that, given 
the unique position of authority and trust occupied by prosecutors, they have an 
overarching duty to do justice and, thus, avoid using unnecessarily inflammatory tactics. 
See, e.g., State v. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. 
Griffths, 101 ldaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 (1980), overruled on othergrounds by 
State v. LePage, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981); State v. Wilbanks, 95 ldaho 346, 
353-55, 509 P.2d 331, 338-40 (1973). Indeed, more than 100 years ago, the ldaho 
Supreme Court explained as follows: 
"A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, 'acting in a quasi judicial 
capacity.' It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful 
means to secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in 
the courts of his judicial circuit. He should see that they have a fair and 
impartial trial, and avoid convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt 
him to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make statements 
to the jury, which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire 
for success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by 
arguments based on anything except the evidence in the case, and the 
conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same. To 
convict and punish a person through the influence of prejudice and caprice 
is as pernicious in its consequences as the escape of a guilty man. The 
forms of law should never be prostituted to such a purpose." [Holder v. 
State, 25 S.W. 279 (1 894).] . . . 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do 
not look with favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any 
possible state of facts which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant in a particular case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for 
the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to 
see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in so 
doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but 
competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, 
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Imin, 9 ldaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 610-11 (1903) (quoted with approval in 
State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007)).$ 
In light of the foregoing, it is now well-recognized that prosecutors may not utilize 
emotional appeals-whether they be appeals to sympathy, fear, anger, or any other 
One hundred and two years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used similar 
reasoning to explain why inflammatory emotional pleas are still deemed to be improper: 
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order 
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future 
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the 
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or 
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by 
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing 
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a 
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. 
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, I149 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United 
States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 
741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon, a case in which the 
defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, portions 
of the prosecutor's closing argument focused on the personal comfort and community 
safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at 1149. The Ninth 
Circuit held that, "[tlhat entire line of argument . . . was improper." Id. Then, after 
quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it observed that since 
Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in fact, been 
in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments about 
the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were "irrelevant 
and improper" because "[tlhey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to enter a 
verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact." Id. at 1149-1 150. 
emotions-in their closing arguments to juries. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, - ldaho -, 
181 P.2d 496, 501-02 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the 
prosecutor's closing argument highlighted concerns about the protection of the public 
at-large, as well as concerns for the rights of victims); State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 
87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Here, . . . the prosecutor's appeal to the jurors' 
emotions was overt and express, conveying not simply that the witness's testimony was 
implausible or lacking credibility, but that jurors ought to respond to the testimony with 
irritation and resentment. Such appeals to emotion during closing argument are plainly 
improper."); Sfate v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 367, 972 P.2d 737, 745 (Ct. App. 1998) 
("[TJhe prosecutor's statement was an improper reference to the jurors' families and 
hypothesized the commission of a crime against them. . . . This type of hypothesis is an 
appeal to jurors' fears, not a 'fact' proven by the evidence nor a reasonable inference 
based upon the evidence. Therefore it is not a proper consideration for the jury's 
decision or for counsel's argument."); State v. Peite, 122 ldaho 809, 819, 839 P.2d 
1223, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a question 
of an alleged victim in order to generate sympathy for that person); State v. Baruth, 107 
ldaho 651, 656-57, 691 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding prosecutorial 
misconduct where the prosecutor argued that "the entire criminal justice system" was on 
trial and that the jury was "the only thing standing between the people of this community 
and [the defendant] robbing or doing anything else he chooses to anyone else in the 
community"). 
As noted above, the prosecutor in this case urged the jury to find Mr. Schultz 
guilty in order to give the alleged victim hope and show her that "the system works," and 
to protect her and all of society from Mr. Schultz and other would-be abusers. 
Specifically, he argued as follows: 
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of giving out 
hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to know that the 
system works. Show her the system works. You can protect Laurie 
Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the evidence and 
returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the defendant 
accountable. I ask you to do that. 
(Battery Case Augmented Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.6.) This argument, like the 
prosecutors' pleas in Weatherspoon, Beebe, Phillips, Pecor, Peite, and Baruth, 
encouraged the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on sympathy for Ms. Morrill, a desire 
to protect her from further abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence 
problems, not the facts of the case. Accordingly, it was wholly improper. 
E. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes 
Fundamental Error 
Mr. Schultz concedes that neither of the instances of misconduct complained of 
above was objected to by his attorney at trial. However, instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct may be considered fundamental errors which can be raised for the first time 
on appeal. In State v. Spencer, 74 ldaho 173, 183, 258 P.2d 1147, 1154 (1953), for 
example, the ldaho Supreme Court held as follows: "While we have generally held that 
where there is no objection made at the time to the statements by an attorney in his 
argument to the jury, the court will not consider alleged error in this respect . . . this is 
not necessarily true as to arguments of prosecuting attorneys in criminal cases." More 
recently, in State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of 
Appeals noted similarly: 
Although we do not apply the fundamental error doctrine here, it should be 
recognized that if prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious and 
prejudicial, the trial court's failure to intervene sua sponte may be found on 
appeal to be fundamental error requiring reversal of a conviction. The trial 
courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged to monitor the 
course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and to 
impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right 
to a fair trial. 
Id. at 88 n.2, 156 P.3d at 589 n.2 (emphasis added). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that prosecutorial misconduct constitutes 
fundamental error if it is "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced 
to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 
877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994) (quoted in State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 
956, 969 (2003)). With regard to closing arguments specifically, prosecutorial 
misconduct constitutes fundamental error only if the comments were so egregious 
andlor inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a 
ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 
Stafe v. Corfez, 135 ldaho 561, 565,21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 2001). 
In this case, it is clear that the fundamental error standard is satisfied and that 
Mr. Schultz' claims may be considered on appeal despite the lack of a 
contemporaneous objection by defense counsel. With regard to the prosecutor's 
comment on Mr. Schultz' failure to testify, the ldaho Court of Appeals has already held 
that improper prosecutorial comments on the defendant's silence constitute 
fundamental error. See State v. Lopez, 141 ldaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 
(Ct. App. 2005) (finding fundamental error where the prosecutor elicited testimony from 
a police officer about the defendant's post-Miranda silence and then highlighted that 
testimony during his rebuttal closing argument) 
With regard to the prosecutor's exhortation to find Mr. Schultz guilty out of 
sympathy for Ms. Morrill, a desire to protect her from further abuse, and a desire to cure 
society's domestic violence problems, those comments constitute fundamental error as 
well. In Barufh, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's claims that the 
community would be at risk if the jury acquitted the defendant were "inflammatory 
statements calculated to influence a jury to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence," and, thus, constituted fundamental error. Baruth, 107 Idaho at 656-57, 691 
P.2d at 1271-72. The present case is more egregious than Barufh because it involved 
not only a plea to convict based upon a fear of future criminality against the community, 
but also pleas to convict based on sympathy and a desire to protect the alleged victim, 
Ms. Morrill. Accordingly, it is more than clear that the prosecutor's argument in this 
case was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice 
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to 
determine guilt on factors outside the evidence," and that the proverbial bell could not 
have been unrung by an admonishment from the district court. 
F. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes 
Reversible Error 
Admittedly, "the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant [only] to a fair trial, not 
a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Thus, not all trial 
errors-or even all consfifufional trial errors-require reversal of the defendant's 
conviction. Id. Some errors may be so minor in terms of their effect on the factfinding 
process that they may be deemed to "harmless." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1 967). 
In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the reviewing court 
determines whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. "To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else 
the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Yates v. Evatt, 
500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the inadmissible evidence. Id. 
at 404-05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added). 
In this case, it simply cannot be said that the jury's verdict was surely 
unattributable to the prosecutor's comment on Mr. Schultz' silence or his exhortation to 
convict Mr. Schultz out of sympathy for Ms. Morrill, a desire to protect her from further 
abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence problems. As should be clear 
from the above statement of facts, this was a close case, especially on the issue of 
whether Mr. Schultz and Ms. Morrill were living together. Given the state of the 
evidence, there is a strong possibility that the jury would have found only misdemeanor 
battery, or even acquitted Mr. Schultz altogether, had it not been for the prosecutor's 
misconduct in his closing statements. Indeed, there is a distinct possibility that the 
jurors would not have concluded that Mr. Schultz and Ms. Morrill lived together and, 
thus, Mr. Schultz was not guilty of a felony, but for their concern that a misdemeanor 
conviction would not be adequate to show Ms. Morrill "that the system works," protect 
her, and protect similarly-situated women. In short, there is a very real risk that the 
prosecutor's improper arguments affected the jury's verdict; therefore, that misconduct 
cannot be deemed harmless under Chapman. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his conviction in the Battery Case and remand that case for a new trial. 
DATED this 4'h day of September, 2008. 
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